Human dignity, a cornerstone of personalism

By: J. Arie Biemond & Maurits Potappel

Dr. J. Arie Biemond obtained his PhD in philosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam with the dissertation "Homo dignus: human dignity in the economy". He is currently working as a researcher at the Erasmus Economics & Theology Institute.

Maurits Potappel LLM MA pursues a PhD at the Theological University Utrecht. His research focuses on the Catholic and Protestant contribution to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Keywords: Human dignity, Imago Dei, Maritain, Pico Della Mirandola, Relationality

Download as PDF: Biemond, Arie J. and Potappel, Maurits, ''Human dignity, a cornerstone of personalism.'' (2024). Institute for Christian Personalism.

Introduction

Personalism is a relatively young branch of philosophy, yet, it has its roots in ancient ideas. Among other influences, it draws on the Christian understanding of human dignity. Human dignity is an idea that dates back to time immemorial. Although the term itself was coined during the Renaissance, it can, in a sense, be seen as an expression of the Christian view of man. At the same time, human dignity, dignitas humana, has always been contrasted in theology with human misery, miseria. Human existence can only be understood through the paradox that man is simultaneously dignified and miserable, with life unfolding between these two extremes.

Value of the human person

The idea that the human person has a special value, even something divine predates theology and was also widespread in pagan thought. For instance, we find in the Roman thinker Cicero[i] and in the mystical Hermetic philosophy[ii] a significant praise of man, and a profound reflection on the special position of man. In Cicero, this is motivated by human reason and its associated qualities, while in Hermes the emphasis is placed on the moral duty to do good and choose the spiritual over the carnal.

Although there are many similarities between these views of human dignity and those found in Christian thinkers, the similarities should not mislead us. There is a fundamental difference between the two: while in Christian thought every human being possesses an inalienable dignity, in these pagan ideas human dignity is primarily a potentiality, which becomes the possession of those who succeed in realizing it. The same applies to many other, non-Christian views of dignity, such as those in Islam[iii] or Confucianism[iv]. In these perspectives, dignified treatment is reserved only for those who deserve it, whereas Christian charity extends to all, without reservation.

In the writings of the Church Fathers, we find a further elaboration of human dignity, which builds on both Biblical texts and classical thinkers. Their general starting point is the story told in Genesis 1-3 about the creation of man. Authors such as Lactantius[v], Augustine[vi] and Gregory of Nyssa[vii] focus on the creation of man in God's image, the imago Dei, and the associated moral mandate. Because man is created in God's image, and thus resembles God in a certain way, he holds a very high status. This elevated status is accompanied by a moral mandate, which is inseparable from it: namely to preserve and rule over the earth. Based on this, the Greek Church Father Gregory describes man as a king[viii], while Augustine argues that man is called to actively reflect God[ix]. For the Church Fathers, human dignity and the moral mandate to do good and to love are closely intertwined.

In Augustine, we find one of the earliest extensive discussions of the person. In his book On the Trinity, he examines whether the theological novelty of distinguishing three persons in God rather than three substances is a laudable idea[x]. He believes person is the right term, but still falls far short of accurately describing God: “It has been said: three persons; but less to say this, rather than having to be silent”[xi]. In the following sections, he explores the relations within the Trinity and between God and man, but acknowledges that these relations surpass human comprehension. 

Human freedom

In the Middle Ages, the emphasis is primarily on human misery, and the value of man becomes something more closely associated with eternal life. Pope Innocent writes a highly influential treatise in which he extensively discusses human misery[xii]. This diminishing view of human dignity is met with indignation during the Renaissance. A wave of writings appears celebrating human dignity, the most important of which is probably Oratio de hominis dignitate, the Discourse on Human Dignity by Giovanni Pico della Mirandola[xiii]. In this work, he weaves together ideas from classical antiquity, Christianity, the Kabbalah, the Babylonian astrologers and other sources available at the time, into a more or less coherent synthesis, claiming to present the unity of knowledge about man. What characterizes Mirandola is that he describes classical grounds of human dignity – such as human rationality, morality and creation in God's image – as secondary. He argues that human dignity lies primarily in human freedom: the freedom to choose between good and evil, which distinguishes man from all other beings. With this position, he places a new emphasis on the concept of dignity, and his contribution greatly influenced the subsequent discussion on dignity.

A characterization of dignity

In this Christian tradition, a perspective on human dignity—the value of being human—has developed, in which it is primarily linked to creation in God's image. The conviction that man was specially created by God is central to what makes humanity unique. This special creation is expressed in the human capacity for rationality and morality, although these qualities remain secondary in theology. According to Christian theology, human dignity is universal, inherent, and active. It is universal because everyone is created in God's image. It is inherent because one does not need to earn it, for example, through good works. Finally, it is active, as it comes with the moral duty or calling to do good. In other traditions, different interpretations of human dignity prevail, where it may be seen as particular, earned, or passive. These interpretations stand in contrast to the Christian understanding of dignity.

Human dignity after the Enlightenment

In the Enlightenment, however, the theological, Christian perspective on dignity is called into question. Galileo's conviction that the earth and the planets revolve around the Sun, and that the Earth is therefore not the centre of the cosmos, leads to a radical shift in worldview. The idea that man was created by God, let alone in His image, is abandoned in many Enlightened circles. With this shift, the idea of ​​human dignity also comes under scrutiny. It is Pascal, in his Pensées, who reflects on the implications of the new way of thinking and the shock it causes to Christian certainties. Mirandola's confident presentation of human dignity no longer convinces Pascal[xiv], instead, it strikes him as arrogance. In light of human misery and human insignificance in an endless universe, who is man? Only grace, Pascal argues, can make man truly worthy, enabling him to become the image of God that he was meant to be.

However, the new interpretation of the cosmos can also lead to radically different conclusions. The Scottish sceptic David Hume, who no longer believed in God or commandments, arrives at a radical relativization of human dignity. He argues that a human being is only relatively more rational and moral, and therefore more worthy, than an animal. In that case, a human being is, in principle, no more valuable or important than an animal[xv]. For Hume, the key point is whether a person is useful to society – that determines his value. This position implies a denial of universal human dignity.

In response to this line of thought, Immanuel Kant attempted to provide a secular foundation for human dignity. He argues that only morality is an end in itself, possessing intrinsic value and that it is therefore the basis of human dignity[xvi]. Kant connects dignity with morality, rationality, and freedom, meaning he does not require the idea of man's place within the cosmic order. This secular alternative to dignity remains highly influential—perhaps due to the lack of a better option.

Personalism of Maritain

This Kantian rational expression of dignity was partly accepted but deepened by a twentieth century philosopher and personalist, Jacques Maritain. Maritain accepted Kant's second formulation of the categorical imperative that man is an end in itself. One can say that personalism builds on this Kantian foundation. However, Maritain criticized Kant’s foundation of human dignity in human reason. Instead, Maritain wanted to ground human dignity in the idea of imago Dei.

Maritain sought to combine the insights of the Christian tradition with the insights of modernity on man. The personalism of Maritain can therefore be seen as an attempt to revive the tradition that preceded Enlightenment thinking about man which wanted to do justice to man’s transcendental origin, and the idea of imago Dei. He contrasted this older anthropology with the modern anthropology in which human dignity is being violated.

He stated that ‘today, human dignity is trampled under foot far and wide. Even worse, it collapses from the inside, for guided by the pure perspective of science and technology we are at loss when it comes to discovering the rational foundations of the dignity of the person, and to believing in these’.[xvii] Maritain stated that the concept of dignity has been disconnected from its source, God, in the Renaissance and Enlightenment. ‘The task of the emergent civilization (..) will consist in refinding and refounding the sense of that dignity, in rehabilitating man in God and through God, not apart from God.’[xviii]           

Maritain argued that a vital part of the resemblance of man with God, is the capacity of the human person to enter into relations with other human beings.[xix] The particular idea of human dignity which Maritain defends, therefore carries a profound relational aspect. According to Maritain this relational aspect flows forth from the nature of the human person, who has an ‘inner urge to the communications of knowledge and love which require relationships with other persons.’[xx] A person is not an isolated monad who is constantly focused on his own thoughts and being. In contrast, the personalistic philosophy, which seeks to continue the Christian insights of the tradition on the human person, stresses the relational nature of the human person.

Current societal perspectives on human dignity

However, one can ask if this relational approach to human dignity has taken root in contemporary society. In the empirical research[xxi], I (JAB) investigated whether this thought on dignity is also prevalent in Dutch society.

In this research, the central question is what people consider important for a dignified life, in order to provide insight into their understanding of the more abstract concept of human dignity. The interviewees were asked to rank aspects that may be important for a dignified life and then to explain their choices. The research shows that all participants are convinced of the importance of human dignity. There appear to be six perspectives on dignity among the Dutch, with only one of these closely aligning with the Christian understanding of human dignity.

Two of the six perspectives focus on the sensual, as they locate dignified living in ‘enjoyment’ and ‘carefree living.’ In the first perspective, feeling good about oneself is central, while in the second, the absence of worries is the core of a dignified life. In these perspectives, sensory and emotional experience are the focal points of human existence. These views are fundamentally at odds with the Christian understanding of what matters in human life. They emphasize what scholastic thinkers would have labelled the lower aspects of human life, which we share with animals and, to some extent, even with plants. The unique value of the human person is absent in these perspectives.

Three of the six perspectives focus specifically on the self, on the human being as an individual, in the forms of ‘self-development,’ ‘self-determination,’ and ‘independence.’ In these perspectives, there is more room to do good and to use human reason. Both developing oneself, having control over oneself, and acting independently require rational thinking and moral reflection. These perspectives certainly allow space for the human person.

Yet, it is remarkable that a secondary place has been reserved for fellow human beings in these perspectives: other persons are seen as indispensable for a dignified life, but they remain subordinate to the realization of the self. Only in the sixth perspective does it explicitly resonate that the other is indispensable for a dignified life, thereby allowing real room for the importance of human morality and relationality. In this perspective, love and respect for the other are goals in themselves, not merely instrumental for one’s own well-being. This sixth perspective fully embraces the human person. By emphasizing the importance of relationships with others, it views human relationality as the core of human dignity and life. However, it is the only perspective that closely aligns with Christian personalism.

From this research, I conclude that perspectives on a dignified life vary widely in the Netherlands. Although most perspectives do relate to the human person, little attention is generally given to human relationality. Only one of the perspectives prevalent in Dutch society places human relations at the forefront.

Human dignity and the person

It is a deep personalistic insight that human dignity is not only based in reason but also in the idea of imago Dei, the human person resembling God. The personalistic approach to human dignity, developed by thinkers such as Maritain, wanted to create an integralist humanism which also addressed the relational aspect of the person. This follows from the theological insight that God himself is relation. The Christian God is love itself and seeks a relationship with his creation. This love which is constitutional and relational should therefore be reflected in all human persons and in their political and societal aspirations.

A second insight of the Christian personalistic tradition is the concept of love as a response, which can help to deepen the existing concept of human dignity. Philosophy professor O’Higgins, L.C., reflected in a recent published book, Person-centered politics on the consequences of human dignity. Dignity ‘is not just a special price or value, but also the experience of each person as inviolable, as to be affirmed unconditionally, to be loved and respected as an end in oneself’.[xxii] He states that the inherent dignity of a person requires an adequate ‘response of affirmation, not just respect or neutral indifference’.

In this way human dignity is not only a status which helps to protect the human person but also contains a vocation for other human persons to actively seek the good of other human beings. Human dignity understood as a vocation to foster the good of one’s neighbour and to help grow in love is highly necessary in a world filled with indifference and selfish structures.

[i] Cicero, Marcus Tullius. De natura deorum. Translated by Harris Rackham. London: Harvard University Press (45 BC) 1967, 2.53-2.59.

[ii] Hermes Trismegistus. Asclepius. Translated by Gilles Quispel. Amsterdam: In de Pelikaan 1996, par. 6-11.

[iii] Mayer, Ann Elizabeth. The Islamic World and The Alternative Declarations of Human Rights. In Marcus Düwell et al., The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2014, p. 407-413.

[iv] Luo, An’Xian. 2014. Human dignity in traditional Chinese Confucianism. In In Marcus Düwell et al., The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 2014, p. 177-181.

[v] Lactantius, Lucius Caecilius Firmianus. On the workmanship of God. Translated by William Fletcher. Edinburgh: Clark (303) 1871.

[vi] See especially Augustine. On the Trinity. Edited by Gareth B. Matthews. Translated by Stephen McKenna. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge [418?] 2002.

[vii] Gregory of Nyssa. On the making of man. Translated by William Moore and Henry Austin Wilson. Buffalo: Christian Literature Publishing Co (379) 1893.

[viii] Ibidem, par. 2.

[ix] Augustine, On the Trinity, book XII, par. 16.

[x] Augustine, On the Trinity, book V. See especially paragraph 9 till 17. 

[xi] Augustine, On the Trinity, book V, par. 9.

[xii] Segni, Lotario dei Conti dei. De miseria condiciones humane. Translated by Robert E. Lewis. Athens (Georgia): University of Georgia Press (1195) 1978.

[xiii] Pico della Mirandola, Giovanni. Oration. Translated by Brian P. Copenhaver. Harvard University Press: Cambridge (1486) 2008.

[xiv] Pascal, Blaise. Pensées. Paris : Guillaume Desprez. Reprint, Classiques Garnier (1669) 2011, pensée 671.

[xv] Hume, David. Essays, Moral, Political and Literary. London: Cadell. Reprint, Indianapolis: Liberty Fund (1777) 1985, p. 581-596.

[xvi] Kant, Immanuel. Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Riga: Hartknoch. Reprint,  Hamburg: Felix Meiner (1785) 1906, p. 79-110. 

[xvii] Maritain, Jacques. The Range of Rason. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1952, p. 93.

[xviii] Idem.

[xix] Maritain, Jacques, (trans. John J. Fitzgerald), ‘The person and the Common Good’ in: The Review of Politics, vol. 8. No 4 (oct. 1946), p. 440.

[xx] Idem, p. 436.

[xxi] Read the full account in: Biemond, J. Arie. Homo dignus : menselijke waardigheid in de economie. Rotterdam: Erasmus Universiteit 2024, p. 109-124.

[xxii] O’Higgins, Eamonn, Person-centered Politics. A personalist approach to political philosophy, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2024, p. 281.